by Juan Medellín
The situation of violence in the department of Antioquia, and its capital city, Medellín, has not improved significantly. The problems of violence have included the growth and strengthening of the armed groups and increases in the number of homicides, armed actions, displaced persons, kidnapings, and disappearances. The guerrilla forces are present throughout Antioquia; the paramilitary groups (also called "self-defense" groups) have advanced from the north, from Urabá and Córdoba to the southwest and east, near Medellín, and in the western and northern sectors of Antioquia.
The city of Medellín is home to some 250 gangs, several of which have as many as 200 armed men, operating as private companies, carrying out actions for hire (mostly by drug trafficking, until the early 1990s, and since then mostly by paramilitary organizations). In addition, groups of militia operate in some poor neighborhoods, some with ties to the guerrilla groups, and others that are independent.
The paramilitary groups have focused their actions in the region in areas where major economic projects are planned. This is the case of Urabá, with the possible construction of a "dry canal" and a major port; in western Antioquia, where plans are in place to build a major hydroelectric dam; and in eastern Antioquia, where there is a struggle for territorial control between the guerrillas and the paramilitary groups in the "reservoirs" region, whose hydroelectric plants provide some 30% of Colombia's electric power. It is around these regions that massacres have been carried out, in violation of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to force the local population to leave. The lands are then appropriated and sometimes forcibly purchased from the original owners.
It could be said that the paramilitary project, begun some 20 years ago in the Middle Magdalena region, and promoted by the armed forces, is today an economic, political, social, and military project, but with a certain degree of autonomy from the armed forces, and that as such, it seeks political recognition in Colombia today.
In the face of this overall situation, the peace movement in Antioquia has been gaining momentum, with various initiatives, all of which have come together under the Regional Permanent Assembly of Civil Society for Peace, which convened 1,200 persons from all sectors and subregions of the department (July 16-17, 1998). The Assembly intends to contribute to the discussion at the negotiating table on issues such as development and social policy, democratic public order and reform of the armed forces, human rights and international humanitarian law, political reform, urban violence, justice reform, and ending impunity.
Two scenarios are considered the most likely outcomes for the peace process in Colombia today. The first is the deepening of the war while talking peace: Each of the actors (guerrillas, government, armed forces, and paramilitary groups) would actually be preparing for more war despite talking increasingly of peace (none of the actors would believe the others). According to the second scenario, a real process of negotiation would now be emerging amidst the war: Mutual confidence-building measures are to be agreed upon to lead to eventual peace negotiations. There will clearly be no solution in the short term. Of course, those of us working for peace from civil society are trying to make peace a reality.
There are four main issues being debated with respect to the peace process in Colombia today: (1) What treatment to accord the paramilitary groups, and in particular whether they should participate in the negotiations, and if so whether they should have a place at the negotiating table along with the government and the guerrillas, or whether there should be parallel government-paramilitary talks (implicit here is whether they are to be accorded political status, or treated as merely criminal groups). (2) The scope of a possible amnesty or pardon, and whether some human rights violations might be left in impunity. (3) Whether there is a will on the part of the ruling business elite to yield a share of their power, or accept greater profit-sharing for the sake of a social policy that truly benefits the poor, and adjust the economic model accordingly. (4) In a moment of economic crisis and fiscal adjustment that affects most of the workers, where are the resources to be found that will be required for the peace process?
Juan Medellín participates in the Permanent Assembly of Civil Society for Peace in Antioquia.